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Abstract
Lauren Biddle: Corruption in Latin America: Political, Economic, Structural, and 
Institutional Causes
(Under the direction of Evelyne Huber)
This work examines the causes of corruption in eighteen Latin American countries from 
1994 to 2005.  With Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index as the 
dependent variable, this study utilizes a pooled cross-sectional times series design to link 
corruption levels with a number of explanatory variables.  There is evidence that economic 
development, inequality, trade, structural reforms index, democracy, federal structure, and 
ethno-linguistic fractionalization have significant effects on corruption.  However, resource 
exports, age of democracy, and public sector size do not appear to affect corruption levels.  
This investigation draws on previous research on corruption but differs through having an 
exclusively Latin American focus and through its use of a time series design.  
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Introduction
With the success of the third wave of democratization in Latin America, widespread 
structural reforms, and second-generation reforms, there is again an emphasis on deepening 
democracy.  Various strands in the political science literature deal with different threats to 
consolidating democracy and ways to overcome these threats.  A term that comes up over 
and over again in a huge range of works is corruption.  From the preliminary research on the 
political costs of corruption (Seligson 2002; Anderson & Tverdova 2003), it appears as 
though high corruption levels are detrimental to democracy because they decrease citizens’ 
confidence in government and regime legitimacy.  This is especially significant as recent
major surveys have also focused on regime evaluations as a way to measure the depth and 
health of democracy in Latin America (UNDP 2004; Latinobarómetro 2004).  Research has 
shown that “independent of socioeconomic, demographic, and partisan identification, 
exposure to corruption erodes belief in the political system and reduces interpersonal trust” 
(Seligson 2002, 408).  As Latin America is a continent of relatively new democracies, 
studying the impact of corruption on these regimes has a powerful justification.  In addition, 
several articles by economists reveal that corruption has a persistent negative impact on 
economic development and reform (Gupta et al. 2002; Sun 1999; Bardhan 1997; Mauro 
1995).  As this region continues to struggle with poverty and inequality, studying the 
relationship of these factors with corruption is also compelling.
Corruption is one of those long-lived, long-studied concepts in political science that 
simply will not go away.  It has been subject to the ups and downs of each major trend within 
2the discipline for more than 50 years.  In the strongly normative early works, corruption was 
thought to be a scourge leading to low levels of economic and political development among 
the underdeveloped nations of the world (Wraith & Simpkins 1964).  Later revisions took a 
different stance on corruption, such as Huntington’s famous statement that “in terms of 
economic growth the only thing worse than a society with a rigid, overcentralized, dishonest 
bureaucracy is one with a rigid, overcentralized, honest bureaucracy” (1968, 386).1  Recently 
the tide has shifted yet again, with many major international organizations, such as the World 
Bank, International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization and Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, pushing governments to reduce corruption.  
Political scientists’ approaches to corruption have ranged from cultural explanations to 
institutional analysis to a political economy view, and back again a dozen times, it seems.  
Scholars have argued for the influence of dozens of variables on corruption levels, including 
economic development, democratic consolidation, neopopulism, neoliberal reforms, 
Protestant work ethic, colonial status, and federalism (Gerring & Thacker 2004; Montinola & 
Jackman 2002; Treisman 2000; Sandholtz & Koetzle 2000). From qualitative to quantitative 
analysis, case studies to large-N, this phenomenon has been tackled with a huge variety of 
approaches and techniques.  This is not meant to imply that there has not been progress in 
understanding corruption; an astoundingly large collection of data has been amassed on the 
topic.  Rather, this laundry list of trends, descriptions, and tools is meant to show how 
complex corruption is and how a variety of approaches is needed to clarify its causes, effects, 
and the implications for policy-making
While there are some well-researched case studies on corruption in various Latin 
American countries (Samuels 2001a; Samuels 2001b; Siavelis 2000), there are few 
1
 See also Nye (1967) and Bayley (1966).
3systematic region-wide assessments of this problem.  In fact, few cross-national analyses of 
the causes of corruption in Latin America have been published at all.  There are several 
global cross-national quantitative analyses of corruption (Gerring & Thacker 2004; 
Montinola & Jackman 2002; Treisman 2000; Sandholtz & Koetzle 2000; Husted 1999); 
however many of the variables that are believed to be related to differences in corruption, 
such as Protestantism, legal system, or English colonial legacy, cannot explain differences 
between Latin American countries.  In this paper, I seek to explore this topic.  First, I will 
discuss definitions and explanations of corruption and their applicability to the Latin 
American reality.  Next I will provide an overview of the available regional data.  I will 
complete a statistical analysis of corruption and its causes and discuss the results.  The paper 
ends with an exploration of the conclusions and opportunities for further research.
Definitions
The classic definition of corruption that most political science works draw on is that 
outlined by Nye: “behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of 
private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or 
violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence” (1967, 
419).  This definition highlights the first crucial element to corruption, which is that it blurs 
the line between public and private spheres.  Another element of corruption that other 
definitions emphasize is the “transactionary” nature of corruption; corrupt acts are exchanges 
between parties that offer inducements and parties that receive benefits (Manzetti & Blake 
1996, 665; della Porta & Vannucci 1999, 20-23).  The third component that scholars see is 
the sense that these exchanges are improper, deviating from some accepted norms 
4(Huntington 1968, 59).  Thus a simple, common definition of corruption is “the improper use 
of public office in exchange for private gain” (Sandholtz & Koetzle 2000, 35; Treisman 
2000, 399).  This is the definition used in this paper, with appreciation for its simplicity and 
relatively straightforward nature.  There is also the added benefit that this definition has 
previously been used in a variety of other works in political science, public policy, and 
economics, which helps with replication and knowledge-building.  Fortunately, good 
empirical data exists that explicitly draws on this understanding of corruption and thus can be 
used to measure it.2
While this definition is necessarily limited, a broader definition is less useful.3 At a more 
general level, corruption is the process by which something good becomes degraded, spoiled, 
or inferior.  But applying this description to human relations is quite complex.  According to 
one view, if corruption is the degradation of something wholesome, then how can we say that 
corruption has occurred in a political system, knowing that some type of corruption has 
probably occurred in all political systems throughout time?  This view points out that it 
becomes difficult to judge corruption in light of the fact that human relations are never 
perfect, thus there is no clear standard to which any given relation should be held.  This type 
of argument leads to cultural relativism, which defines corruption purely by what is not 
common in a society.  If a possibly corrupt act happens all of the time and no one seems to 
2
 Despite the advantages of using this definition in this particular situation, I do not think that it is the final word 
in defining the concept.  In Williams (1999), the author outlines very compelling reasons why re-examining 
corruption is necessary from time to time and suggests that the accepted definition has certain shortcomings.  As 
a clear example, one type of corruption that is conspicuously missing from this concept is corporate corruption, 
like the recent case of Enron.  However, this variety of corruption is outside the scope of this paper.
3
 In a recent article on the theory of corruption, Warren suggests that the definition adopted in this and many 
other investigations is too limiting since “it is far from necessary from necessary for corruption to involve 
government for corruption to be political in nature” (2004, 331).  He argues that the key link between corruption 
and governance is that it violates the democratic norm of inclusion, and thus any theoretical definitions of the 
concept must build from there.
5make a large fuss, then it must not be corruption, but rather some cultural norm.  This sort of 
opinion is counterproductive to understanding and eradicating corruption.  Public officials do 
act appropriately in some places and times.  There are laws and codes of conduct that dictate 
what behavior should be.  There are also professional norms and public opinion that state 
what corruption is and is not.  Much of the previous literature on this subject has upheld the 
idea that there is a common acceptance of what constitutes corruption that transcends purely 
cultural variance (Sandholtz & Koetzle 2000, 35; TI 2005).  In the interests of clarity, then, I 
utilize the concrete, technical definition of corruption rather than exploring differences in 
norms and linguistics here.
The list of forms of official corruption is discouragingly long and varied.  Just a few of the 
main examples given in an article by Caiden include kleptocracy, tax evasion, illegal 
surveillance, sale of public office, extortion, bribery, graft, perversion of justice, 
misappropriation, forgery, embezzlement, intimidation, undeserved pardons, blackmail, 
cronyism, kickbacks, influence-peddling, perjury, and cover-ups (2001, 17).  The multiplicity 
of forms that corruption takes on makes it exceptionally difficult to classify its manifestations 
into types.  The phenomena can be primarily bureaucratic or predominantly political.  Some 
branches of government or geographical jurisdictions may be steeped in corruption while 
others remain relatively clean.  Corruption also varies hugely in both pervasiveness and 
intensity from country to country.  However, within the confusion that the term inspires, 
there are also generalizations that may be made about corruption.  A few of these that Caiden 
points out include:
1.  Corruption has been found in all political systems, at every level of government,
    and in the delivery of all scarce public goods and services.
2.  Corruption is facilitated or impeded by the societal context (including 
international and transnational influences) in which public power is exercised.
63. Corruption is directed at real power, key decision points, and discretionary 
authority. It commands a price for both access to decision makers and influence in 
decision making.
4. Corruption is facilitated by unstable polities, uncertain economies, maldistributed    
wealth, unrepresentative government, entrepreneurial ambitions, privatization of 
public resources, factionalism, personalism, and dependency (2001, 18).
With these generalizations and definition in hand, the measurement of the phenomenon can 
now be considered.
Measurement
Transparency International’s (TI) Corruptions Perceptions Index (CPI) has the widest 
coverage of countries over time of all of the publicly available data sets on corruption in the 
public sector.  Since 1995, this organization has been collecting data from a huge variety of 
sources on the state of corruption in the world. Similar to the above definition, TI defines 
corruption as “the abuse of public office for private gain” (2005).  There are no distinctions 
made on the CPI index between administrative and political corruption or petty and grand 
corruption.  It simply measures the “degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among 
public officials and politicians” (TI 2005).  The information is from surveys of 
businesspeople and assessments by country analysts from around the world, including some 
who are locals in the countries evaluated; final scores thus reflect the perceptions of 
thousands of knowledgeable individuals.  In the first year of operation, the CPI collected data 
on 41 countries from 7 independent surveys for the years 1992-1994.  Ten years later, the 
2005 CPI drew on 16 surveys completed between 2003 and 2005 by 10 independent 
institutions and covering 159 countries.  TI has also calculated retrospective ratings for 54 
countries in the periods 1980-1985 and 1988-1992, though these ratings are less accurate 
than and not directly comparable to the ratings from 1995-2005.
7The CPI was selected to measure the dependent variable, corruption, in this paper because 
its definition of the phenomenon was essentially the same as the definition reached 
theoretically.  It also offers good, though not perfect coverage of Latin American countries; 
the CPI for the years 1995 to 2005 is used here.4  Some researchers criticize the use of the 
CPI on the grounds that it measures only perceptions rather than actual occurrence of 
corruption.  This is a valid point.  However, other types of data have just as many problems.  
Comparing the number of prosecutions or court cases dealing with corruption in each country 
tells more about the stringency of laws, the willingness of prosecutors to pursue such cases, 
and the structure of court systems than it does about the actual existence of corruption.  
Comparing the frequency of reports of corruption in news media, similarly, also tells more 
about the relative independence of reporters or the popularity of such sensationalistic stories 
than about corruption.  In Latin America, especially, anecdotal evidence seems to directly 
warn against trusting this type of data since some politicians allegedly have paid reporters to 
write stories accusing their political enemies of corruption.  Another example of how such 
information can be misleading is the case of leaders who have pulled off political coups, won 
support by accusing the previous regime of corruption, and then turned a blind eye to bribe-
taking or nepotism with in their own governments.  The point is that whatever problems data 
on perceptions of corruption have, they are favorable to the other available options.  In the 
case of the CPI, the validity of perceptions data is increased since it is taken from the 
experiences of people “who are most directly confronted with the realities of corruption in a 
country” (TI 2005).  The charts below detail the culmination of these experiences in the 
region.
4
 These years are all those for which Transparency International calculated CPI scores.
8Figure 1: Corruption in Latin American over time, full5
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 The index runs from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean).
9Figure 2: Corruption in Latin America over time, incomplete
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As is evident in figures 1 and 2, there was no clear trend of corruption levels in Latin 
America from 1995 to 2005.6 Judging from the available data, it appears as though Brazil, 
Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, and Uruguay all improved slightly, 
though not always uniformly.  On the other hand, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela all 
became slightly more corrupt.  Most of the country scores do not change dramatically over 
the years covered in this investigation.  The variation that is seen over time is also hard to 
analyze due to possible changes in how the index was constructed from year to year so any 
generalization in this respect must be cautiously advanced.  In general, then, most variation is 
6
 Regressing time on CPI confirms that there is no statistically significant linear trend.
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from country to country rather than over time.  This indicates that corruption is a fairly 
deeply-rooted problem that does not appear to change quickly in the period examined here.
Explanations
As the above graphs show, there are persistent underlying differences in the amount of 
corruption found in different Latin American states.  Many more officials appear to be 
misusing their power in Paraguay than in Chile, for example.  Experts feel that turbulent Peru 
is cleaner than neighboring Ecuador.  What is really driving these differences in corruption 
levels from country to country? Several main classes of explanations for corruption have 
been advanced by previous research, including economic, structural, political, and historical 
factors.  Each of these factors is held to increase or decrease the likelihood of corruption in a 
given setting.  In this section, most of the major explanations are explained and examined.7
The first cause that researchers have emphasized in all relevant studies on corruption is 
economic development, usually measured as gross domestic product per capita, which is 
thought to work in a variety of ways. At the simplest level, one version of this effect could be 
described as follows: countries with more developed economies have higher quality 
governments and this is associated with lower perceived corruption (Treisman 2000, 401).
Countries at lower levels of development are thought to be less likely to possess the expertise 
or to able to afford the proper mechanisms for government oversight of corruption.8
Similarly, some argue that less economically developed countries generally have lower 
public sector wages, which is thought to increase the incentives for state employees to 
7
 For more technical information on the coding of the explanatory variables, see Appendix 1.
8
 There is also a possible reverse causal relationship between development and corruption, as Mauro (1995) 
suggests that high levels of corruption are a deterrent to foreign investment, though this is hypothesized to be 
less relevant than the relationships discussed above.
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engage in illegal rent-seeking activities to supplement their low income (Montinola &
Jackman 2002, 154).9 This hypothesis can also be supported by the argument that corruption 
is more easily exposed and punished in a more economically developed nation because more 
people are educated and literate and there is a stronger public/private division (Treisman 
2000, 404).  Most generally, “where incomes are low, economic insecurity, if not outright 
poverty means that marginal additions to income can have a large impact on a family’s living 
conditions” (Sandholtz & Koetzle 2000, 36).  For all of these reasons, economic development 
is included in this explanatory model of corruption.
The second variable relating to overall economic state is inequality.10  Authors have found 
evidence that corruption can increase poverty and widen inequality (Gupta et al. 2002).  In 
addition, other scholars suggest that income inequality can contribute to higher levels of 
corruption (Alam 1995, 426).  The idea behind this relationship is that more equal 
distributions of wealth hint at the existence of a strong middle class that protects its interests 
and resists particularistic demands through the formation of interest groups (Scott 1972).  
One quantitative study on the causes of corruption found that inequality had no significant 
effect (Husted 1999, 350).  However, this may be because good data on inequality is difficult 
to find; for time series analysis this is especially true, as inequality figures change slowly.  I 
include inequality as a variable here using newer, more high-quality data than previous 
studies have had available. 
9
 Evidence for this aspect of the argument is not completely clear, however.  La Porta et al. find that relatively 
low government wages actually lead to better government performance (1998, 239).
10
 A third economic variable, inflation, was also considered as possible factor affecting corruption levels.  
Changing inflation increases uncertainty, which may provide people with more incentives to engage in 
stabilizing corrupt pacts to reduce uncertainty.  Economic crises and hyperinflation certainly make it easier to 
avoid detection and punishment of corrupt acts such as embezzlement since the price of money is changing so 
rapidly (Manzetti 2000, 140-141).  However, when inflation was tested systematically as part of the models 
here, it was not significantly related to the overall levels of corruption.  
12
The second type of variable used to explain corruption has to do with how each country 
relates to the international system.  The first part of this argument states that openness to 
trade should reduce corruption.  Trade, measured here as the sum of imports and exports of 
goods and services as a percentage of GDP,11 is thought to help reduce corruption for two 
main reasons.  One is that trade, through dealings with international finance and commerce 
companies with headquarters in the OECD countries, helps to socialize a country’s 
businesspeople and governmental officials to a transnational Western business culture that 
discourages a broad variety of corrupt practices (Sandholtz & Koetzle 2000, 39-40).  The 
second way in which trade is said to reduce corruption is that the competition fostered by free 
trade penalizes bribery and because free trade takes many decisions out of the hands of 
corrupt government officials (Montinola & Jackman 2002, 153).  The trade variable is thus a 
compelling enough explanation to be included in the model.
Another related causal process is that hypothesized to exist between rents from valuable 
natural resources and corruption.  Ades and Di Tella argue that countries with large 
endowments of valuable raw materials – especially fuel, ore, and metal – should have higher 
levels of corruption because corruption in these sectors offers greater potential gain to 
officials who control the rights for exploitation (1999, 992).  Other works have found support 
for the explanation that corruption is associated with valuable natural resources through data 
that shows that OPEC countries have higher levels of corruption due to the structure of the 
organization and the incentives that oil production creates (Montinola & Jackman 2002, 
11
 Using the sum of imports as a share of gross domestic product is an alternate way to measure trade.  
However, the imports and exports method is more common; in the final regression, results are virtually the 
same for both measures.
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154).12 In this model, this variable is called resource exports and includes fuel, ore, and 
metal exports.
In addition to the economic outcome measures of trade volume, resource exports, and 
economic development, I also include an economic policy variable.  The structural policy 
efficiency index created by Lora “summarizes the status of progress in policies in the trade, 
financial, tax, privatization and labor areas” (2001, 3).  Trade policy reforms include the 
lowering of tariff barriers and exchange-rate unification. Financial reforms consist of the 
lowering of reserve requirements, eliminating interest rate controls, and loosening loan 
regulations.  Simplification, administrative reform, reduction of corporate income taxes, 
introduction of valued-added tax systems, etc. comprise the tax reform component.  The 
privatization area includes the sale of firms in a variety of sectors including energy, 
telecommunications, and financial entities.  Finally, reforms in the labor area comprise 
lowering the cost of layoffs and facilitating the hiring of temporary workers.  All of these 
reform measures are intended to increase competition and reduce the involvement of the 
government in the economy (Williamson 2000), both of which are hypothesized to reduce 
political corruption.  For these reasons, the structural reforms index is used in combination 
with the outcome variables of economic policy to compare how far each country’s economic 
reforms have progressed during the period and the possible impact of these policies on 
corruption.  
Next, political causal variables must be considered.  The two that are most relevant to 
discussing corruption in Latin American countries are level of democracy and age of 
12
 OPEC membership, used in Montinola and Jackman (2002) is not a compelling explanation in Latin America 
since there is only one OPEC member, Venezuela, in the region.  The measure, resources, that was utilized to 
test for this explanation thus was the more broadly applicable one that included fuel, ore, and metal exports as a 
proportion of merchandise exports.
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democracy.  In a democratic government, leaders must compete for re-election which means 
that the public is free to punish office-holders for corruption.  In addition, because of the 
participation of a wider group of people in government, at least through elections, there is 
more transparency with democratic governance.13 As Sandholtz and Koetzle argue, “the 
more extensive are democratic freedoms and the more effective are democratic institutions, 
the greater will be the deterrent to corruption” (2000, 38).  Corruption thrives on secrecy; the 
relative openness of democratic societies should help to discourage corruption. In addition, it 
is argued that the coordination problem in bribe-collection is more difficult to solve among 
legislators in a democracy (Bardhan 1997, 1330).  The level of democracy is conceptualized 
in this paper using the two dimensional (political rights and civil liberties) approach created 
by Freedom House since this is the approach used in the majority of the other works on 
corruption surveyed here (FH 2006).
Not only is the current level of democracy important however, but so is the longevity of 
democracy.  Since democracy takes time to become the “only game in town,” the longer a 
country has experienced democratic rule, the more likely that country is to have strong 
democratic institutions and deeply held democratic norms (Sandholtz & Koetzle 2000, 39).  
This socialization effect should then cause corruption to be lowest in those countries that 
have most recently experienced a long spell of democratic governance.  Also, there may be a 
difference between those countries that have had long periods of semi-democracy in contrast 
to those countries that have had shorter but more meaningful experiences with  democracy.
Thus, a good measure of age of democracy for these purposes must capture the entrenchment 
13
 However, Weyland argues the converse when he points out that corruption in Latin America has increased, at 
least anecdotally, during the third wave of democratization.  As he writes, “by dispersing power and requiring 
the consent of several institutions in decision making, the return of democracy has extended the range of actors 
who can demand bribes” (Weyland 1998, 108).
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of institutions and norms, taking into account not only the most recent period of democracy
but also the total historical experience with democracy, and also the extent of democracy in a 
given period.
Next, there are variables that deal directly with the government structure.  There is a 
common argument in the literature, often linked to neoliberal ideas, that states that the larger 
the relative size of the public sector, the greater the likelihood that there will be higher 
corruption.  This is easiest to illustrate economically: “the more contracts a government has 
to offer, the more incentives private sector actors have to bribe officials authorized to 
dispense contracts” (Montinola & Jackman 2002, 154).  Neoliberal economic theory argues 
that a large public sector distorts competition and offers opportunities for rent-seeking by 
political and economic actors.14 Although a portion of the degree of government regulation 
is already captured by the structural reforms index variable, I also include the size of public 
sector in this analysis, measured as general government consumption as a percentage of 
GDP.  While related to some aspects of the reform index, public sector size may have 
different significance in explaining corruption since it is a measure of outcomes rather than 
policies.
Another explanation for corruption levels also has to do with the constitutional 
configuration of government. In Rose-Ackerman, the author theorizes that Westminster and 
party-centered parliamentary systems are superior to both party- and candidate-centered 
presidential systems, which in turn are better than candidate-centered parliamentary systems 
for avoiding corruption (2001, 40).  This is expected because the first two types of 
parliamentary systems provide more effective checks on individual politicians by their party, 
14 This argument is plausible, although as Montinola and Jackman point out using lobbying as an example, not 
all rent-seeking activities necessarily involve corruption (2002, 154).
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constituents, and opposition.  Gerring and Thacker find that presidential systems do tend to 
have higher corruption levels than parliamentary systems (2004, 327).  Further, the authors 
also determine that unitary systems have less corruption than federal systems.  Decentralized 
political systems may be more susceptible to corruption because they must find creative ways 
to overcome the coordination problems that come with divided authority.  In addition, since 
corruption thrives on personal face-to-face relationships not based on concrete norms it may 
be more prevalent in countries where a larger proportion of government takes place at 
subnational levels (Treisman 2000, 407).  Other authors hypothesize that federalism could, in 
some situations, decrease corruption levels.  As Treisman points out, a federal structure of 
government may lower corruption since officials in different jurisdictions or levels of 
government must compete in the provision of public services for which kickbacks could be 
required in a less competitive system (2000, 407).  Looking at the impressionistic evidence 
from Latin America and the prevalence of political bosses, local machine politics, 
coronelismo, etc., it appears that the first argument is more valid and that federalism in Latin 
America should increase corruption. While the arguments about parliamentarism and 
presidentialism are interesting, only the effects of federalism in Latin America can be tested 
as there are currently no true parliamentary systems in the region (Beck et al. 2005).  Thus, I
include a dummy variable for federal structure in this analysis.15
15
 The key variables, parliamentarism and unitarism, from Gerring and Thacker (2004) were first used to 
operationalize these concepts.  However, there was no variation on the parliamentarism variable in Latin 
America as all of the countries in this sample scored a 1 (for presidential) on their scale.  The unitarism variable, 
which encompasses territorial government (1=non-federal, 2=semi-federal, 3=federal) and bicameralism (0=no 
upper house or weak upper house, 1=upper house not dominated by lower house (where some effective veto 
power exists, though not necessarily a formal veto), 2=same as above but also noncongruent) dimensions, was 
not available for all countries in the same.  When unitarism was included in the model, it was not significant.  
Instead, following Treisman (2000, 431-433) a more basic 0-1 dummy variable for federal/unitary structure was 
used.  This variable does achieve significance.
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The final variable that plays a role in the following analysis is ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization.  Treisman (2000) and Mauro (1995) hypothesize that corruption will be 
greater in countries that are more ethnically divided.  This may be because bureaucrats in 
these societies may favor members of their own group (Mauro 1995, 693).  Another 
possibility for the association between ethno-linguistic fractionalization and corruption 
perception is that the type of corruption that is found in divided polities is perceived more 
often by observers because it is of a more damaging type (Shleifer & Vishny 1993, 609).
These authors argue that, when a society is homogenous and tightly knit, joint profit 
maximization in bribe collection is more likely since knowledge of deviations spreads 
quickly through established group ties.  This leads to a relatively low bribe equilibrium and a 
less destructive variety of corruption (1993, 609). This variable, operationalized as the 
probability that two randomly selected inhabitants of a given country will not belong to the 
same ethno-linguistic group in 1960, is included in both Treisman (2000) and Mauro (1995).  
For these reasons, this variable has been included in the analysis given here.
Despite the comprehensive nature of the economic, structural, political, and institutional 
variables discussed above, there are some variables that have been purposely omitted from 
this analysis because of their lack of applicability in the Latin American context.  A lot of the 
literature on corruption emphasizes variables such as the prevalence of Protestantism, 
English colonial experience, colonial experience in general, and legal system type (Treisman 
2000; Sandholtz & Koetzle 2000).  However, these are not particularly important variables in 
Latin America as they do not vary.  For example, the prevalence of Protestantism is fairly 
low in most of Latin America.  The present levels of Protestantism are also the result of a 
gradual and recent trend; thus over the short time period here, change over time would be 
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very small if even detectable.  In addition, most Latin American Protestants are evangelicals.  
Many of these churches are not overtly political and do not tend to get involved in political 
debates.  Thus the influence of the “Protestant tradition” in shaping public morals, political 
behaviors, and norms, and thereby reducing corruption is not a compelling causal argument 
to make for Latin America.  In addition, none of the countries analyzed here were British 
colonies; all belonged to either Spain or Portugal and thus inherited cultural norms from the 
colonial period cannot explain differences from country to country here.  The legal system 
type in all of these countries is also the same – all share civil law systems16 (Treisman 2000, 
449-450).  For all of these reasons, these cultural-historical variables were not included in 
this analysis.
Data
The main hypothesized relationships discussed above were operationalized using ten
independent variables called econom ic development, inequality, trade, structural reforms 
index, resource exports, democracy, age of democracy, public sector size, federal structure, 
and ethno-linguistic fractionalization.17  To estimate the impact of these variables on 
corruption, I created a dataset that includes almost all Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking
16
 Although the impact of the type of legal system cannot be tested in Latin America as there is no variation, 
another variation in the legal system was analyzed as a potential factor.  The “rule of law” index from the 
Government Matters IV database measures “the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as 
well as the likelihood of crime and violence” (Kaufmann et al. 2005).  However, this variable was rejected from 
the analysis for a number of reasons.  First, it is much more of a proximate measure, almost to the point of being 
another measure of corruption, than any of the other explanations explored here.  Second, many of the surveys 
used as sources for this variable were also included as sources for the measurement of the dependent variable.  
Again, this led me to the conclusion that these indicators of rule of law and corruption come too close to 
measuring the same phenomenon to be separated causally.
17
 More information on how each variable was measured as well as a table of summary statistics (see Table 3) 
can be found in the Appendix.  
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former Spanish and Portuguese colonies18 in Latin America from the years 1994 to 2005.
These countries are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. However, despite utilizing the fairly 
comprehensive CPI dataset, there were still large amounts of missing data, as summarized in 
the table below.  
Table 1: Countries and years with missing CPI data
Country Year
Bolivia 1995
Costa Rica 1995 - 1996
Dominican Republic 1995 - 1996, 1998 - 2000
Ecuador 1995
El Salvador 1995 - 1996
Guatemala 1995 - 1996, 2000
Honduras 1995 - 1996, 2000
Nicaragua 1995 - 1996, 2000
Panama 1995 - 2000
Paraguay 1995 - 1996, 2000-2001
Peru 1995 - 1996
Uruguay 1995 - 1996, 2000
This data is not missing at random; those countries that had missing data tend to be smaller 
and poorer than those countries for which full data is available.  Table 2 below summarizes 
the independent and dependent variable measures comparing compares those countries that 
have full information and those that are missing data on the dependent variable.19 While this 
18
 Cuba is the only former Spanish colony omitted from the sample.  This is due to the extremely limited 
amount of reliable data on this country’s government and economy.  In addition, most of the variables and 
theories advanced here rely on competition.  Since it is a non-democracy, causal inferences made about other 
Latin American nations may not hold for Cuba.  More information on sample selection is given in Appendix 1.
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 Data for the majority of the variables is available for almost all years.  Economic development, democracy, 
age of democracy, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, and federal structure all had complete data for the 
appropriate years.  For corruption, 41 values are missing.  For trade, 5 values are missing.  For resource exports, 
12 values are missing.  For public sector size, 6 values are missing.  For the structural reforms index, 108 values 
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table cannot provide information on the significance of these means, it is suggestive of the 
difference between these two groups of countries.  Those countries that have missing 
information, in comparison with those with full information, have lower levels of 
development, higher trade percentages, fewer resource exports, higher levels of ethno-
linguistic fractionalization, and are not federal systems.  This missing data is problematic 
because in most methods of estimation, any country-year that is missing data on any of the 
independent or dependent variables is dropped from the analysis.  This means that the states 
of Central America will be highly underrepresented, while countries like Argentina, Mexico, 
and Brazil will inordinately dominate the sample.  
are missing as the index in Lora (2001) only spans the years 1985-1999.  For inequality, 120 values are missing 
due to the unavailability of high quality data.  
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Table 2: Variable summary contrasting full- versus missing-information countries
Full Information Countries: 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela
Missing Information Countries: 
Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru, Uruguay
Variable Name Mean Mean
(standard deviation) (standard deviation)
Corruption 3.869 3.259
(1.611) (1.119)
Economic Development 8.370 7.513
(0.417) (0.603)
Inequality 53.800 53.433
(5.210) (4.948)
Trade 42.526 66.938
(15.918) (32.524)
Structural Reforms Index 0.549 0.563
(0.042) (0.069)
Resource Exports 34.239 16.162
(26.354) (17.791)
Democracy 5.818 5.112
(1.654) (1.751)
Age of Democracy 30.364 23.796
(12.012) (14.242)
Public Sector Size 14.022 11.148
(4.156) (3.128)
Federal Structure 0.667 0
(0.475) (0.000)
Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization 16.5 32.561
(10.321) (22.518)
In order to create a model that applies to all nineteen of the countries included in the 
analysis, I used multiple random imputation to estimate the missing values.20 This was 
completed using Multivariate Imputation by Chained Equations (MICE), an algorithm in 
20
 A similar method of multiple random imputations and its potential applications in political science are 
described in King et al. (2001).  The programs designed by these authors, including Amelia and Clarify, are 
likely the most popular implementations of multiple random imputation algorithms in political science.  
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Stata 9 that generates estimates of missing values .21  Using all of the available data on all 
variables in the data set, this program creates ten datasets with the missing values filled in.  
Also estimated are measures of the uncertainty introduced by the data imputation process.  I 
then used a Stata macro that combines the ten datasets and estimates regression coefficients
while taking into account the added uncertainty.22 In addition to generating estimates from 
the imputed data, I estimated the model with the original dataset , missing points unchanged,
in order to compare the results of the two methods.
The decision of which type of model to use here is a challenging one, as this type of 
pooled times-series cross-sectional data may exhibit both heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation of the errors (Stimson 1985). One solution for these possible problems is 
including in the model a  lagged dependent variable to deal with the autocorrelation and 
country dummies to deal with the heteroskedasticity (Stimson 1985, 929).  Another solution 
is to correct these problems using OLS with panel-corrected standard errors and a lagged 
dependent variable to remove autocorrelation (Beck & Katz 1995, 634).  Although both of 
these solutions are compelling, recent works in comparative politics suggest that the 
statistical procedures that have grown out of these authors’ suggestions have become 
problematic de facto standards for many different types of data (Kittel 1999; Plümper, 
Troeger, & Manow 2005).  These authors suggest that these fixes are applied without a deep 
examination of the underlying structure of the data at hand and the questions which the 
researcher seeks to answer.
21
 In King, Tomz and Wittenberg, the authors write that “fully Bayesian methods using Markov-Chain Monte 
Carlo techniques are more powerful than our algorithms because they allow researchers to draw from the exact 
finite-sample distribution, instead of relying on the central limit theorem to justify an asymptotic normal 
approximation” (2000, 352).  I elected to use the MICE program’s algorithms over Amelia or Clarify because it 
does utilize the more powerful Markov-Chain method of imputation.
22
 This program, called “micombine”, was written by Patrick Royston.  More information is available at 
http://www.multiple-imputation.com.
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In light of these suggestions, before fitting a model, I examined the data carefully.  I first 
checked for multicollinearity in the variables by analyzing the correlation matrices and the 
variance inflation factors, which gave no indication that this may be an issue.23  I then 
calculated an ordinary least squares regression of both data sets and checked the residual 
plots for possible skewness.  Again, there was no clear evidence of any problem.  I then 
performed an OLS regression model on both the dataset with missing values and the imputed 
datasets.  I chose the OLS regression model mostly for theoretical reasons.  This 
investigation focuses mainly on accounting for differences in corruption between countries; 
since country dummies would remove most of this type of variance, I elected not to use them.  
I have tried to control for many of the historical and cultural variables that country dummies 
account for through careful sample selection instead.  I also did not include period dummies 
to control for possible contemporaneous correlation as the levels of corruption in one country 
are unlikely to have an immediate impact on those of other countries in the region.24
In addition to the OLS model, I utilized a robust cluster error correction, a post-estimation 
technique that utilizes the Huber/White/Sandwich estimates of variance.  This correction 
accounts for the possibility of autocorrelated and heteroskedastic errors within countries, 
problems likely to occur with this type of data.25 This error correction is robust because it 
deals with both panel-level heteroskedasticity but also any type of correlation within the 
observations of each group (StataCorp LP 2005, 43-48). The resulting coefficients, 
significance levels, and fit statistics for both data sets are described in Table 3 below.  
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 See Appendix 2 for variance inflation factors and correlation matrices of the data.
24
 Given the small size of the sample (11 years in 19 countries), the inclusion of period and country dummies 
would also have caused further problems by inordinately decreasing the degrees of freedom in the model.
25
 This is likely since each country’s measurements were taken over a 10 year period, thus they are not 
independent from one period to the next (serial correlation of errors).  In addition, the panel heteroskedasticity 
of errors is likely because units may have different variances, if, for example units with lower values have lower 
error variance (Plümper, Troeger, & Manow 2005, 329). 
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Table 3: OLS regression results
Missing data Imputed data
Coefficient Coefficient
Variable name (robust standard error) (robust standard error)
Economic Development 1.950** 1.580**
(0.477) (0.391)
Inequality 0.120* 0.075*
(0.050) (0.028)
Trade 0.001 -0.017*
(0.007) (0.006)
Structural Reforms Index 8.319* 5.636*
(3.515) (2.318)
Resource Exports -0.008 0.001
(0.008) (0.009)
Democracy -0.105 -0.206†
(0.163) (0.105)
Age of Democracy 0.032† 0.009
(0.017) (0.014)
Public Sector Size -0.120† -0.053
(0.057) (0.043)
Federal Structure -1.914** -2.031**
(0.636) (0.632)
Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization -0.011 -0.020*
0.010 (0.009)
Constant -20.572** -12.561**
(5.657) (4.033)
N 52 198
Number of clusters 17 18
R2 0.691 0.687
Adjusted R2 0.616 0.670
Root MSE 0.931 ---
† p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01
Results from OLS regression with robust cluster standard errors.
Results
The overall fit of the model is good for both the missing data and imputed data.  The 
adjusted correlation coefficient of the set with missing data is 0.616 with 52 observations.  
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The adjusted correlation coefficient calculated for the combination of the ten imputed 
datasets is 0.670 with 198 observations.  This indicates that a significant portion in the 
variance of the dependent variable is explained by the model for each dataset.  In addition, 
many of the same variables obtain significance for each dataset except for trade, democracy, 
age of democracy, public sector size, and ethno-linguistic fractionalization.  The sign of 
almost all of the coefficients, with the exception of trade, are the same for the datasets, both 
missing and imputed.  As the imputed data takes into account more information about each of 
the countries and it appears mostly consistent with the missing dataset, I will direct the 
interpretation below to this model.  
Of the ten hypotheses discussed above, seven of the variables appear to have significant 
effects on the dependent variable.  In this analysis, the direction of the coefficients is more 
important than the actual coefficients calculated in the regression.  This is due to the fact that 
the dependent variable is calculated as an index of perceptions.  Since it is an index, there is 
only very limited meaning in being able to say that a 1 point increase in democracy score 
results in a 0.02 change in CPI score, for example.  The CPI is meant to be interpreted as a 
comparative measure not as an absolute measure; thus, in the section below the results are 
emphasized more for their direction relative to the predicted effects than for the magnitude of 
those effects. Table 4 below presents an organized summary of these results.  
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Table 4: Hypotheses and results with imputed data
Variable Name Hypothesis
Hypothesized 
Coefficient
Observed 
Coefficient Significance
Economic 
Development
As economic development increases, 
corruption should decrease. + + **
Inequality
As inequality increases, corruption 
should increase. - + *
Trade
As trade increases, corruption should 
decrease. + - *
Structural 
Reforms Index
As the level of structural reforms 
increases, corruption should decrease. + + *
Resource Exports
As resource exports increase, 
corruption should increase. - +
Democracy
As level of democracy increases, 
corruption should decrease. - - †
Age of 
Democracy
As age of democracy increases, 
corruption should decrease. + +
Public Sector 
Size
As the size of public sector increases, 
corruption should increase. - -
Federal Structure
Unitary systems should have less 
corruption than federal systems. - - **
Ethno-linguistic 
Fractionalization
As ethno-linguistic fractionalization
increases, corruption should increase. - - *
† p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01
Note that for the dependent variable, 0 indicates highly corrupt and 10 indicates perfectly clean.
Economic development has a strong relationship in the predicted direction with the
dependent variable.  This finding is supported by all of the major cross-national studies on 
corruption (Gerring & Thacker 2004; Montinola & Jackman 2002; Treisman 2000; Sandholtz 
& Koetzle 2000; Husted 1999).  As the level of development of a country increases (while 
controlling for the other variables), that country is much less likely to suffer high levels of 
corruption.  Since the economic development variable was calculated as a logged value, this 
also lends support to the hypothesis that this effect would diminish at high levels of 
development.  Though most of the countries here are not at extremely high levels of 
development, there is still some evidence for diminishing returns on development.
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Inequality does not function in the model as predicted.  While Husted (1999) finds that the 
effect of inequality on corruption is not significant, here the effect of the variable is 
significant.  However, the sign of the coefficient is not in the expected direction.  
Surprisingly, the positive sign here indicates that as inequality increases, the level of 
corruption should decrease!  There are several possibilities for why this may be so.  One 
immediate suspicion is the data itself – good indicators of inequality in Latin America are 
difficult to compute and to use.  In this analysis, the highest quality Gini coefficients were 
carefully selected from eight different sources, a process that i ntroduces the possibility of 
differences in the level of accuracy and the types of measurement error across the pooled 
time series.  These measurement issues may be obscuring the true relationship between 
inequality and corruption.  Another strong possibility is that the level of inequality in Chile is 
substantially driving the results for this variable.  Chile is the least corrupt country in every 
year and it also has a higher than average level of inequality compared to the other countries 
surveyed here.   When Chile is excluded from the analysis, the effect of inequality on 
corruption changes direction.  This indicates that in most of Latin America, higher inequality 
is associated with increased corruption, as hypothesized.  Further research could clarify the 
relationship between inequality and corruption and help to explain what makes Chile 
different.26
The coefficient of the trade variable is significant, though it is not in the predicted 
direction.  In contrast to the findings of Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000, 45), this indicates that 
26
 The statistical techniques usually utilized to test for influential points (such as residuals, leverage, DFFITS, 
DFBETAS, Cook's d, etc.) were not available for this analysis.  Because this project incorporates multiple 
random imputation, many post-estimation techniques must be modified.  Future revisions and advances in 
programming should be able to clarify the significance of Chile’s inequality levels on corruption further.
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increasing trade does not decrease corruption.27  Part of this result could be an artifact of the 
tendency for smaller countries to have a higher percentage of their economy based on trade.  
Thus the effect of this variable may not be accurately controlled for across all countries in 
this model.  However, the effect of the variable capturing policy progress, structural reforms 
index, is significant and the coefficient is in the expected direction.  These results indicate 
that there may be complex relationships between reform policy, results, and corruption that 
need further investigation.  This is especially true since trade policy is one of the few causes 
of corruption analyzed here that government policy-makers do have some control over.  
The coefficient for the effect of mineral and fuel resource exports is neither significant nor 
in the expected direction.  This suggests that there may not be a straightforward relationship 
between the proportion of a country’s exports from metal, fuel, and oil wealth and the level 
of corruption in that country.  This conclusion is supported by Treisman’s analysis, which 
determines that the effect of resource exports changes both direction and significance level 
from year to year (2000, 415).  In addition, it indicates that the empirical evidence found by 
Montinola and Jackman (2002, 166) for OPEC membership fostering corruption may not be 
generalizable to other highly valuable natural resource exports.  A possible explanation is 
that the proportion of these materials as a share of exports may not accurately reflect their 
share in the domestic economy so rent-seeking is not truly represented by the figures chosen 
(Treisman 2000, 429).  
The level of democracy variable narrowly achieves significance at the 0.10 level and the 
coefficient is in the expected direction.  This indicates that there is only weak evidence that 
the level of democracy diminishes corruption while controlling for all the other variables.  
27
 Treisman’s (2000, 415) findings, although he uses a slightly different measure of trade, also contradict 
Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000).  He finds that the effect of trade on corruption small and insignificant in most 
years.
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Previous research has also found that the current level of democracy does not strongly affect 
corruption (Treisman 2000, 438-439).  The age of democracy variable has a very small, not 
significant, though positive as predicted, coefficient.  This may indicate that the longevity of 
democracy can have contradictory effects.  Although previous research suggests that older 
democracies should be less corrupt (Treisman 2000, 415; Sandholtz & Koetzle 2000, 44; 
Gerring & Thacker 2004, 310), this effect may not be uniform across all countries.  This 
could be due to a number of reasons.  One purely technical reason for the empirical results is 
that the correlation between age of democracy and level of democracy (calculated to be -
0.463) may be distorting the effect that each might separately have on the dependent variable 
in the model.  A more theoretical reason is offered by Rose- Ackerman:
Democracies based on strong legal foundations provide a stable framework for
economic activity.  For this framework to operate efficiently, however, politicians
    must seek reelection and must feel insecure about their prospect, but not too insecure.
This leads to a ‘paradox of stability’.  Too much security of tenure can further 
corrupt arrangements.  Too much insecurity can have the same effect (1999, 127).
This peril could be exemplified by the recent case of Venezuela.  A similar idea is expressed 
by Montinola and Jackman, who argue that “corruption is typically a little higher in countries 
with intermediate levels of political competition than in their less democratic counterparts, 
but once past the threshold, higher levels of competition are associated with considerably less 
corruption” (2002, 167).  Another possibility is suggested by Huber, Rueschemeyer, and 
Stephens: Latin American democracies could be falling into the trap of consolidating formal 
democracy while moving away from fully participatory democracy and equality (1997, 323).  
Public sector size also behaves differently than theorized.  Similar to the performance of 
this variable in Husted (1999, 350-351), Montinola and Jackman (2002, 166), and Treisman 
(2000, 436), the effect of government size is not significant.  In this analysis, the direction of 
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the effect is as hypothesized.  Thus, a healthy role for government may not be as negative as 
the Washington Consensus suggested.  Some governments in Latin America, at least, do not 
appear to be increasing corruption through spending – although this is no guarantee that 
government consumption is an unqualified useful good, either. This finding may provide 
support for previous research which suggests that higher wages for public sector workers can 
improve governance (Montinola & Jackman 2002, 169).
Next, the analysis supports the hypothesis that a federal structure is likely to increase 
corruption.  The coefficient is in the predicted direction, negative, and highly significant.  
This lends credit to the hypothesis that the more politics takes place on a local level, the 
higher the likelihood of corruption.  Previous studies also have reached the same conclusions 
on this variable (Treisman 2000, 430-432; Gerring & Thacker 2004).  It is supported by 
anecdotal evidence as well, since the four federal states of Latin America, Mexico, 
Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina, do appear to have abnormally high levels of corruption 
given their values on the other explanatory variables.  However, it is likely that this measure 
of federalism is a proxy for political fragmentation.  Systems that are highly fragmented are 
likely to have more corruption since there are more veto points in which other players can 
join the game and demand payoffs.  This hypothesis may be interesting to investigate in 
future research.  However, attempts to test it here were unsuccessful due to the lack of high 
quality data on fragmentation or veto points for the countries and years required.28
28 I did try to test this aspect of the theory using the variables legislative fractionalization, which captures “the 
probability that two deputies picked at random from the legislature will be of different parties” and Herfindahl 
Index from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2005).  However, there was a large amount of 
missing data and the relationship of these variables to corruption was unclear.  These effects never achieved 
significance.  
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Ethno-linguistic fractionalization was the last variable included here.  In his analysis, 
Treisman finds that this variable is insignificant once the model also controls for 
development (2000, 429).  He argues that any effect of ethno-linguistic fragmentation is 
indirect and probably mediated by its effect on GDP per capita.  Surprisingly, though both 
economic development and ethno-linguistic fractionalization are included in this model, 
ethno-linguistic fractionalization has a direct effect.  As ethnic division increases, corruption
also increases; this effect is highly significant. However, as with federalism, the process 
behind this variable’s effect cannot be narrowed down to a single certain causal path.  
Federal structure and ethno-linguistic fractionalization are somewhat endogenous, making it 
difficult to separate out their independent effects.  Overall, both fit into the general 
perception of corruption as a solution to which people resort when faced with uncertainty or 
in order to overcome obstacles to coordination.  
Since so many of the variables appear to be related and have insignificant effects, I also 
calculated a trimmed model that only includes the variables with strong explanatory power.  
The portion of variance explained by the more parsimonious model, with an adjusted 
correlation coefficient of 0.659, is nearly as great as the variance explained by the full model.  
None of the directions of the effects of the independent variables change from the full to the 
trimmed model.  However, democracy, which is only marginally significant in the full 
model, is more significant in the trimmed model.  The change in the level of significance is 
likely due to dropping age of democracy from the model, with which it is moderately 
correlated.  
Table 5: Trimmed model results
Imputed data
Coefficient
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Variable name (robust standard error)
Economic Development 1.661**
(0.404)
Inequality 0.058*
(0.027)
Trade -0.016*
(0.007)
Structural Reforms Index 4.633*
(2.136)
Democracy -0.205*
(0.095)
Federal Structure -2.161**
(0.604)
Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization -0.017*
(0.007)
Constant -12.191*
(4.638)
N 198
Number of clusters 18
R2 0.671
Adjusted R2 0.659
† p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01
Results from OLS regression with robust cluster standard errors.
Table 6: Trimmed model hypotheses and results with imputed data
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Variable Name Hypothesis
Hypothesized 
Coefficient
Observed 
Coefficient Significance
Economic 
Development
As economic development increases, 
corruption should decrease. + + **
Inequality
As inequality increases, corruption 
should increase. - + *
Trade
As trade increases, corruption should 
decrease. + - *
Structural 
Reforms Index
As the level of structural reforms 
increases, corruption should decrease. + + *
Democracy
As level of democracy increases, 
corruption should decrease. - - *
Federal Structure
Unitary systems should have less 
corruption than federal systems. - - **
Ethno-linguistic 
Fractionalization
As ethno-linguistic fractionalization 
increases, corruption should increase. - - *
† p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01
Note that for the dependent variable, 0 indicates highly corrupt and 10 indicates perfectly clean.
Conclusions
This investigation is different from previous quantitative work on the causes of corruption 
in two main ways.  One, the focus of this work is exclusively on explaining corruption in 
Latin America.  Most of the previous research projects examined here draw their samples 
from the entire world.  In these global cross-national studies, due to lack of information, 
several countries in Latin America are simply dropped from the analysis for most years.29
This means that any conclusions that these authors make may not be generalizable to Latin 
America as a whole.  Two, this paper is unique because it examines the causes of corruption 
using a pooled time series design.  The previous similar works in the field all rely on between 
29
 In Montinola and Jackman (2002), Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay were dropped from one or more cross-sections of 
their model.  Treisman (2000) drops these countries plus Ecuador from one or more cross-sections of his model.  
Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000) only include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and 
Venezuela in their sample.  Husted (1999) states only that 44 countries are in his sample.  Gerring and Thacker 
(2004), since they also utilize multiple random imputation of missing data, do include the Latin American 
countries in their sample.
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one and three cross-sections taken from the late 1980s to the late-1990s to make causal 
inferences.  In contrast, this work encompasses data on the independent and dependent 
variables stretching from 1994 to 2005.  Thus, any differences in the conclusions reached 
here may be due to the different focus, scope, design, and time of the project.  Further 
research must be done to determine the limitations and commonalities of the inferences made 
by various works in this area.   
In studying corruption, there is inherently a desire to understand the causes of this ugly 
pathology so that it may be destroyed.  Throughout this paper runs the normative assumption 
that corruption is an undesirable and negative phenomenon, especially in a continent so 
plagued by the problem.  To this end, I identified and tested ten main explanations of 
corruption levels in Latin America.  There is some evidence that seven of the ten, economic 
development, inequality, trade, structural reforms index, democracy, federal structure, and 
ethno-linguistic fractionalization, have significant effects on corruption, although not all of 
the mechanisms of causation are fully understood.  These findings, especially those on 
inequality and trade, cast doubt on several common assumptions made about the causes of 
corruption in Latin America that have had real consequences in shaping public policy in the 
region.  For example, the argument that neoliberal economic reforms do impact corruption 
finds some supporting evidence here although the full relevant period is not captured by this 
dataset.30 But neither lower levels of government spending nor increased trade are linked to 
lower corruption, contrary to the hopes of some neoliberal theories.  However, extending 
policies of structural reforms does seem to decrease corruption.  From this analysis, it is clear 
30
 This relationship appears to be especially strong when discussing the sale of public companies.  
Privatizations, driven by the push for economic reform, have been plagued by corruption allegations throughout 
Latin America.
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that more study on reforms and corruption in the context of the particular realities of Latin 
American states is necessary.
Another direction for future research on corruption in Latin America is to examine the 
links between corruption and party politics.  While most Latin American countries are 
presidential and use some form of proportional representation electoral systems, there are 
variations on whether systems have closed or open lists.  Rose- Ackerman hypothesizes that 
these and other rules of competition and the resultant degree of party- or candidate-centered 
politics will affect the level of corruption found in the system (2001, 39). Similarly, 
Weyland argues that the decline of party systems and neopopulism, a governing mode that 
arose from the weakening of elite control and the economic crises of the past few decades, is
particularly related to corruption in Latin America (1998, 133-114).  Neither Weyland’s nor 
Rose-Ackerman’s assertions have been empirically tested yet, but the strength and 
organization of party systems, reform efforts, and corruption could provide an interesting and 
important nexus in the future for understanding politics in Latin America.
    As noted throughout this paper, research on corruption has covered a huge range of topics 
already.  A vast array of knowledge has been collected by generations of skilled academics.  
However, this is no reason to close the book on this type of research.  On the contrary, here is 
a topic where the field can truly advance rapidly and meaningfully.  Scholars in this area 
have a rich body of previous works upon which to build, a multiplicity of leads for future 
investigation, and most importantly, an urgent need for the work to progress.  
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Appendix 1: Variable Descriptions and Sources
Country
All of the Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking former colonies of Spain and Portugal except 
for Cuba were included in this data set.  Cuba was excluded due to its long history as a non-
democracy and a restricted economy.  The remaining countries were chosen because of their 
common histories, legal systems, religions, etc.  These commonalities allow this 
investigation to control for some of the cultural differences that have been used in previous 
research to explain differing levels of corruption.  For example, Treisman (2000) utilizes 
dummy variables for common law system and former British colony or UK.  None of the 
countries included in my sample had common law legal systems or British heritage.  Another 
variable utilized in Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000), the percent of the population that is 
Protestant, was also eliminated by my choice of countries since none of the countries in my 
sample has a large, influential Protestant community that has historically had enough 
influence to make a difference for corruption levels.     
Corruption
The corruption measure used in the study is the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 
produced by Transparency International (TI).  The scores were from the 1995-2005 ratings.  
For these countries, the CPI was constructed from between 4 to 12 sources from 4 to 8 
independent institutions (including the World Economic Forum, World Bank, Freedom 
House, the Economist, Columbia University, PricewaterhouseCoopers, European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, and Gallup International) that collected data over the 
period from 1993 to 2005.  The CPI ranges from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (fully clean).  
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CPI data was available for Argentina in the years 1995 to 2005; Bolivia from 1996 to 2005, 
Brazil from 1995 to 2005, Chile from 1995 to 2005; Colombia from 1995 to 2005; Costa 
Rica from 1997 to 2005; Dominican Republic from 1997 and 2001 to 2005; Ecuador from 
1996 to 2005; El Salvador from 1997 to 2005; Guatemala from 1997 to 1999 and 2001 to 
2005; Honduras from 1997 to 1999, and 2001 to 2005; Mexico from 1995 to 2005;
Nicaragua from 1997 to 1999 and 2001 to 2005; Panama from 1997 and 2001 to 2005; 
Paraguay 1997 to 1999 and 2002 to 2005; Peru from 1998 to 2005; Uruguay from 1997 to 
1999 and 2001 to 2005; and Venezuela from 1995 to 2005.  The CPI data for 1997 was taken 
from Lambsdorff (1998, 104-7) for Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru.  All of the CPIs for other years were 
taken from Transparency International (1995-2005).    
Economic Development
This variable was assessed using the Gross Domestic Product per capita at constant market 
prices, constant 2000 dollars.  The data was transformed logarithmically to account for its 
positive skew.  In addition, this transformation models a theoretical expectation as well since 
the positive effect of economic development on corruption is theorized to have diminishing 
returns at higher and higher levels of development (Montinola and Jackman, 2002).  The data 
for this variable was lagged by one year (relative to the CPI) to account for possible problems 
of endogeneity (since data from the CPI released in 2005 is collected during the year 2004).  
The GDP data is for the years 1994-2004 and is taken from the Economic Commission for 
Latin America (ECLAC, 2006) and the Caribbean Social Indicators and Statistics database.
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Inequality
This variable was measured using the Gini coefficients compiled in the World Income 
Inequality Database (WIDER 2005). The data was lagged by one year relative to the CPI, so 
values are only for the years 1994-2004.  As with all Gini coefficients, larger numbers 
indicate higher levels of income inequality.  These particular Gini coefficients were chosen 
for their quality (based on ratings in the WIID) and are all based on household per capita
disposable income.  The majority cover the entire country’s population expect for those data 
for Argentina and Uruguay, where only data covering urban or metro areas was available.
The table below details the specific sources of each inequality score as documented in the 
WIID.
Table 7: Gini coefficient sources
Source Country and Years
Cerisola et al. (2000) Argentina 1994-1998
Deininger & Squire (2004)a
Bolivia 1996-1997, 1999-2000; Brazil 1995-2001; Chile 1995, 1996, 
1998-2000; Colombia 1995-2000; Costa Rica 1994-2000; Dominican 
Republic 1995-1998; Ecuador 1994, 1995, 1999, 2000; El Salvador 
1995-2000; Guatemala 1998; Honduras 1994-1998; Mexico 1994, 
1996, 1998, 2000; Panama 1995-1998, 2000; Paraguay 1995, 1997, 
1999; Peru 1994, 1997; Venezuela 1995-1998, 2000
Gasparini (2003) Argentina 2001; Guatemala 2000; Nicaragua 1998; Uruguay 2000
IADB (1999) Colombia 1994; El Salvador 1994; Paraguay 1994
Luxembourg Income Studyb Mexico 2002
Székely (2003)
Bolivia 1995; Ecuador 1998; Honduras 1999; Panama 1999; Peru 
2000; Uruguay 1997, 1998; Venezuela 1999
Székely and Hilgert (2002) Chile 1994; Uruguay 1995
WDI (2006) Nicaragua 2001
aDeininger, Klaus and Lyn Squire. 2004. Unpublished World Bank data based on unit record data.
bLuxembourg Income Study (LIS). 2005. Restricted online database used by WIID.
Trade
Trade was measured using the sum of exports and imports of goods and services as a share 
of gross domestic product for the years 1994 - 2004.  The measure was lagged by one year 
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relative to the CPI to account for possible endogeneity.  The data was accessed in the World 
Development Indicators database of the World Bank.  
Structural Reforms Index
This variable is Lora’s Structural Reforms Index (2001, 20).  It is a composite measure of 
structural policy efficiency as an average of calculations made in several areas: trade policy, 
financial policy, tax policy, privatization, and labor legislation.  The index ranges from 0 to 1 
where 0 corresponds to the “worst reading for any year and any country in the period and the 
countries considered, and 1 to the best” (28).  The number thus generated summarizes the 
progress of the economic reform project in each country.  As with the other economic 
variables, this data was lagged by one year.
Resource Exports
This measurement is the proportion of merchandise exports that are made up by fuel, ore, 
and metal exports following Treisman (2000, 413) and Ades and Di Tella (1999).  As with 
the other economic measures, this variable was lagged by one year relative to the CPI.  The 
data was obtained from the World Development Indicators database for the years 199 4-2004.
Democracy
This measure was calculated from the Freedom in the World reports 1994-2004 by 
Freedom House, and recorded lagged by one year relative to corruption score.  Freedom 
House ranks the level of democracy in a country on two dimensions, political rights and civil 
liberties.  The score for a country on each dimension ranges from 1 (free) to 7 (not free).  The 
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overall democracy score for each country is the sum of the political rights score and the 
political liberties score.  Scores on this variable thus range from 2 (highly democracy) to 14 
(highly restricted).  Treisman (2000, 413) and Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000, 41) also utilize 
this measure to operationalize democracy.
Age of Democracy
This measure is the number of continuous years of democracy since 1945 each year from 
1995-2005.  It was determined using the classification detailed in Mainwaring and Hagopian 
(2005, 3).  Their classification is of Latin American political regimes beginning in 1945 and 
rates each country year as authoritarian, semi-democratic, or democratic.  The data entered 
for 1995 – 2005 is the sum of the years of democracy (1 point) and semi-democracy (0.5 
point) for each country since 1945.  
Public Sector Size
Public sector size was measured using the general government final consumption 
expenditure as a percentage of the country’s GDP in the years from 1994 to 2004 following 
Montinola and Jackman (2002, 158). As with the other economic measures, this variable 
was lagged by one year relative to the CPI due to the fact that data for each year of the CPI 
was actually collected in the year before its release.  This data was obtained through the 
World Development Indicators database by the World Bank.
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Federal Structure
This was a dummy variable that was valued at 1 for federal states and 0 for unitary states.  
The definition of federal is that given by Riker (1964, 11): “(1) [at least] two levels of 
government rule the same land and people, (2) each level has at least one area of action in 
which it is autonomous, and (3) there is some guarantee (even though merely a statement in 
the constitution) of the autonomy of each government in its own sphere.” Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela were all classified as federal states based on the 
information given about their government structures in the Database of Political Institutions 
(Thorsten et al. 2005).
Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization
This variable was included following from both Mauro (1995) and Treisman (2000).
Scores on ethno-linguistic fractionalization reflect the probability that two randomly selected 
inhabitants of a given country will not belong to the same ethno-linguistic group as of 1960.
The data was originally published in the Atlas Narodov Mira (1964) and reproduced in
Taylor and Hudson (1972, 271-273).  The data was transformed from Taylor and Hudson’s 
original measure into a percent measure following Mauro (1995).
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Appendix 2: Summary Statistics and Information on Missing and Imputed Datasets
Table 8: Correlation matrix of original dataset (with missing values)
Corrupti
on
Economic 
development Inequality Trade
Structural 
reforms
Resource 
exports Democracy
Age of 
democracy
Public 
sector 
size
Federal 
structure
E
L
F
Corruption 1.000
Economic 
development 0.395 1.000
Inequality -0.113 -0.536 1.000
Trade 0.058 -0.416 -0.071 1.000
Structural 
reforms 0.117 -0.223 0.295 -0.199 1.000
Resource 
exports -0.018 0.134 -0.027 -0.163 0.089 1.000
Democracy -0.445 -0.126 0.329 -0.383 -0.081 0.122 1.000
Age of 
democracy 0.435 0.426 -0.276 -0.097 -0.145 0.413 -0.382 1.000
Public sector 
size -0.094 -0.037 0.409 -0.496 0.203 -0.023 0.251 0.264 1.000
Federal 
structure -0.192 0.653 -0.013 -0.515 -0.125 0.204 0.222 0.047 0.084 1.000
ELF -0.198 -0.345 0.099 -0.095 0.569 0.053 -0.057 -0.355 -0.186 -0.136 1
Table 9: Variance inflation factors of original dataset
Variable name VIF 1/VIF
Economic Development 4.84 0.207
Inequality 2.08 0.482
Trade 3.31 0.302
Structural Reforms Index 2.05 0.487
Resource Exports 2.12 0.473
Democracy 2.46 0.407
Age of Democracy 4.01 0.250
Public Sector Size 3.22 0.311
Federal Structure 2.65 0.377
Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization 2.56 0.407
Mean VIF 2.93
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Table 10: Correlation matrix of imputed datasets
Corruption
Economic 
development Inequality Trade
Structural 
reforms
Resource 
exports Democracy
Age of 
democracy
Public 
sector 
size
Federal 
structure
E
L
F
Corruption 1.000
Economic 
development 0.498 1.000
Inequality -0.179 -0.500 1.000
Trade -0.090 -0.115 0.041 1.000
Structural 
reforms 0.055 -0.221 0.259 -0.090 1.000
Resource 
exports 0.040 0.118 -0.004 -0.305 0.158 1.000
Democracy -0.494 -0.400 0.319 -0.305 0.093 0.174 1.000
Age of 
democracy 0.507 0.513 -0.364 -0.180 -0.180 0.383 -0.463 1.000
Public sector 
size 0.083 0.019 0.315 -0.247 0.262 0.109 0.020 0.300 1.000
Federal 
structure -0.079 1.576 -0.144 -0.384 -0.082 0.237 0.113 0.111 0.201 1.000
ELF -0.233 -0.279 0.161 -0.210 0.336 0.187 0.160 -0.283 -0.214 -0.163 1
Table 11: Variance inflation factors of imputed datasets
Variable name VIF 1/VIF
Economic Development 3.20 0.312
Inequality 1.79 0.560
Trade 1.77 0.566
Structural Reforms Index 1.47 0.680
Resource Exports 1.95 0.512
Democracy 2.16 0.463
Age of Democracy 3.77 0.265
Public Sector Size 2.05 0.490
Federal Structure 2.64 0.378
Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization 1.67 0.599
Mean VIF 2.25
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